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President Sekou Toure



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③ GUINEA-US: President Toure's Visit

President Toure hopes his visit to Washington this week will strengthen his reputation as a responsible statesman.

The Guinean leader was known until the mid-1970s for his radical anti-Western and pro-Soviet policies. Since then, he has cultivated better relations with the West in response to growing domestic pressure for liberalization, dissatisfaction with Soviet economic and military aid, and the need for more Western aid.

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Toure still allows Soviet transport flights en route to Angola to refuel at Conakry and permits Soviet naval ships to call at Conakry. The Soviets remain Guinea's principal arms supplier.

Toure plans to register his concern about Libyan leader Qadhafi's scheduled chairmanship of the OAU and his subversive activities in West Africa. Toure has been in the forefront of African opposition to seating the Libyan-backed Polisario Front at the OAU summit in Tripoli next August.

Comment: Toure's distrust of Qadhafi is outweighed by his desire to host the OAU summit in Conakry in 1983. He therefore is unlikely to boycott the summit in Tripoli or to take any other action that would diminish the importance of the OAU or its chairmanship.

Toure is unlikely to alter his one-man style of rule or his socialist convictions, and any serious threat to his position would cause him to seek close ties with Moscow again. He also will continue to look to the Soviets for military aid not available in the West.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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EC: Summit Preview

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The summer summit of 10 EC leaders begins today in Brussels amid markedly increased economic and political tension between the EC and the US. Recent US measures affecting trade and Middle East developments are likely to dominate the discussions. The participants probably will amplify their foreign ministers' protest of US policies issued last week, while simultaneously calling for increased high-level consultations with Washington.

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US complaints against massive EC agriculture and steel subsidies already have elicited EC threats to bring the issue before the GATT and the OECD. Although the EC leaders will likely conclude that efforts to negotiate agreements on agriculture and steel should continue, they also may set a timetable for formal action and possible trade retaliation should negotiations collapse.

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The summit almost certainly will formally reject the recent US decision to extend and expand the embargo of US equipment for use on the Siberian gas pipeline. EC foreign ministers last week branded the decision as contrary to international and EC laws. The EC Commission is likely to submit a legal brief to the summit outlining relevant West European laws and possible court action.

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On more general trade issues, the EC leaders probably will protest what they consider Washington's predisposition to unilateral interpretations of international trade practices. They fear this apparent indifference to West European political and economic constraints is heightening tensions and risks fostering increased protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, the summit communique is likely to plead for increased consultations with Washington and may call for informal, periodic ministerial-level discussions.

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The EC leaders also will debate the most recent OECD proposal on export credit interest rates. Commission officials expect the summit will give final approval to the export credit compromise, but the linking by Paris of US actions on steel and the pipeline to the credit issue could thwart agreement and lead to temporary suspension of the OECD measure. [redacted]

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Middle East

EC leaders will examine a report on the Middle East prepared by Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans that reaffirms the Venice Declaration--which calls for self-determination and a negotiating role for the Palestinians--and advances suggestions for reducing tensions. The leaders will issue a statement on the Middle East, but they may give the assessment by Tindemans short shrift. [redacted]

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19 [redacted] The heads of government want to issue a strong gesture of displeasure over Israeli military activity in Lebanon but do not want to propose measures that will be rejected by all the parties to the conflict. According to EC officials, EC-Israeli trade agreements rule out sanctions against Tel Aviv. [redacted]

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Foreign Policy Coordination

Summit participants probably will defer a decision on the West German - Italian plan to incorporate the informal system of foreign policy coordination into the formal Community structure. Denmark continues to oppose the plan, and many other EC members object to specific provisions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Implications

Although the summit may not result in a major redirection in US-EC relations, the EC leaders will begin discussions with a sense that relations are at a crossroads. Increasing trade tensions and substantive differences between the EC and US are making the EC a common focus and probably will lead to closer Community policy coordination. []

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The Ten share a desire to insulate their domestic economies and foreign relations from what they consider to be misdirected US undertakings. Their view that the US has nullified several understandings reached at the recent summits at Versailles and Bonn, especially those relating to steel and to the pipeline embargo, are leading them to reevaluate Washington's trustworthiness in future bilateral and multilateral agreements. []

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The anticipated call for increased consultations does not necessarily signal a greater willingness to seek accommodation or compromise. Instead, it reflects a belief that communication can aid in lessening misunderstandings that emerge from substantive disagreements. EC leaders will look to multilateral understandings to keep international economic relations flexible. []

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